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ABSTRACT
Large-scale infrastructure in conflict-affected states is often seen as
a crucial means to pursue economic growth, poverty reduction,
and increasingly, peace-building. Legitimated by an emergent
‘Business for Peace’ agenda, a variety of private actors now also
engages in such infrastructure projects. The Virunga Alliance is
such an initiative which aims to tackle the interlinked problems
of poverty, conservation and conflict in the east of DR Congo
through commercialised hydro-power. To take stock of the politics
unfolding around such infrastructure efforts, this article analyses
the Virunga Alliance as a form of ‘technopolitics’. This entails
tracing how current is generated, distributed and consumed, and
how these processes generate new sites of power and control. In
describing how Virunga offers a centralised, more concentrated
supply of electricity as an alternative to the decentralised charcoal
circuit, we show how electrification contributes to the expansion
of a form of capitalism that prioritises big businessmen over small
farmers, facilitates rent-seeking by political elites and amplifies








Every MW of electricity generated empowers the community, by creating 1.000 jobs, 5–10%
of which go to ex-combatants. When people are empowered they have the choice to control
their future and move into productive society, away from armed groups. Emmanuel de
Merode, director, Virunga National Park.1
The story is compelling. Through the creation of seven hydro-electricity plants around
Virunga National Park (see Figure 1), the park management aims to become self-
sufficient financially by selling the generated electricity to rural households and busi-
nesses around the park. By attracting private businesses, the park hopes to generate
thousands of jobs for the population living close to the park. Following soft counter-
insurgency logic, the park thinks that by offering employment, young men will be lured
away from armed groups, and the population will become aware that it has a stake in
the park to survive, and will desolidarise themselves from the multiple rebel groups in
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Figure 1. Virunga National Park.
Source: The authors.
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the park.2 Moreover, by providing alternative cooking fuel, rural electrification should
also lower the illegal extraction of charcoal within the borders of the park. To achieve
this, the park management created a private enterprise, Virunga SARL, to execute the
project, which channels revenues of the commercialisation of electricity back to the
park.
This narrative is especially compelling, because it is set in the east of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), a region that has been embroiled in successions of war, civil
conflict and severe poverty for over two decades. The crucial role of electricity in
bringing modern development is so deeply engrained in contemporary development
thinking, so, to put it bluntly, who cares how exactly this common good is brought to
conflict-torn Eastern Congo? However, as so often, the devil is in the details, and the
overarching objectives of pacification and conservation risk ending in their opposites.
In this article, we analyse the Virunga Alliance’s electrification scheme as an instance
of ‘technopolitics’, a term coined specifically to study how technical and political
programmes intersect. Technical systems, from this perspective, are literally charged
with politics: infrastructures constitute a form of power,3 they are imbued with a
symbolic power that link up to expectations of modernity,4 and their design, construc-
tion and rolling out have implications in terms of opening up or foreclosing political
and economic possibilities, rearranging where it becomes particularly effective to
exercise control.5 Restated in such terms, the Virunga Alliance aims to divert the
natural course of water, turn it into hydropower and distribute it in such ways as to
rearrange a whole set of social, economic and political relations in Eastern Congo.6
While it is difficult to argue against the Virunga Alliance’s electrification efforts in
principle, the unfolding of wires, poles and other technical elements across the Congo’s
landscape, it also encounters a variety of frictions, which can ultimately undermine the
very goals it is laid out to achieve.7
In order to appreciate how electricity provision by Virunga SARL is charged with
controversy and contest, we need to delve exactly into how this scheme works in
practice. Although the project presented by the Virunga Alliance attracts extensive
international political and financial support, electrification for conservation in reality
plays out as the commercialisation of the electricity, channelling it towards elites and
thus becoming part of the larger problem of privatisation and elite capture of Congo’s
valuable resources.8
While local dynamics of conflict, severe poverty and precariousness around the park
allowed mobilising support for the development scheme, local populations affected by
this predicament aren’t (yet) able to profit from electrification. The latter rather seems
to materialise as an instance of capitalism extending itself on the back of violent conflict
and severe precariousness.
In this article, we argue that the concrete infrastructures put in place to achieve
conservation and peace-building objectives, have physical properties which open-up a
specific set of political possibilities yet foreclose the very conflict transformation they
were set out to act as a conduit for. The hydropower infrastructures built by the
Virunga Alliance take the shape of closed, centralised power circuits, limiting partici-
pants in production, distribution and channelling consumption to those who already
achieved a certain level of political-economic power. Hence, to be able to profit from
this new form of consuming energy requires certain material preconditions to be in
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place, but also specific cultural properties of end-users, without which the newly flowing
current will fail to translate into peace-building gains. Yet, those who fail to meet these
set preconditions, and will not benefit from electricity, have livelihoods largely revol-
ving around production and consumption in the more decentralised charcoal
economy.9 While thus producing concrete gains for some, the specific way that elec-
trification and conservation are engineered forecloses ‘trickle-down’ effects that could
lead to conservation (addressing deforestation) and peace-building.
In opting for commercial and therefore exclusive energy supply as a vehicle to
achieve its objectives, the Virunga Alliance has swung into motion a powerful dynamic
in which main rationale becomes making profit to pay-off loans, and in which trust of
donors becomes paramount over trust of local populations. A lot of energy which could
have been spent on community engagement is invested in generating yet more bundled
electricity – and in providing ‘physical’ security of the hydro plant infrastructures. In
the process, the ambitions giving rise to electrification are upended, becoming yet
another instance in which Congo’s resources are appropriated by its elites.
This article is based on joint field research conducted by the authors, together with
the Congolese researchers Chrispin Mvano, Janvier Murairi and Saidi Kubuya. We
interviewed representatives of the Virunga Foundation, the ICCN and Virunga SARL.
In this article, we focus on Virunga’s electrification scheme in Bwisha, which is one of
the two chefferies in Rutshuru territory – where the hydro plant of Matebe is located
(see Figure 1) and where preparations for a second hydro plant, Matebe II, are
underway.10 In multiple villages around the park, we interviewed people connected to
the electricity grid, others who are not, customary and administrative authorities,
representatives of local NGOs and small entrepreneurs. In Goma, we interviewed
businesspeople and government officials. In addition, we analysed press releases and
media reports on the Virunga Alliance and the electrification scheme. Moreover, both
authors have worked in the region before, and the analysis in this article is also
informed by earlier field research conducted separately by both authors.
This article proceeds as follows. First, we place the electrification scheme of the
Virunga Park and its aims within the broader theoretical debates around rural electrifica-
tion as a form of ‘technopolitics’. We especially focus on how these technopolitics
intersect with the ‘business for peace’ agenda that has merged with neo-liberal conserva-
tion efforts in the case of Virunga National Park. Second, we situate the case within the
colonial and post-colonial history of infrastructural politics, electrification and conserva-
tion blue-prints in the east of the DR Congo. We then move on to trace how Virunga’s
electrification scheme materialises, following the specific way in which the infrastructures
to generate, market and distribute bundled power lead to new economic and political
opportunities for some while foreclosing certain other aspirations along the high-tension
wires. We conclude with arguing that the promise of rural electrification – that it will
contribute to peace and conservation – becomes effectively lost in translation in the way
its infrastructures connected to the socio-political fabric of the Eastern DRC.
Electricity for conservation, business for peace?
The vast Virunga National Park has a rich biodiversity and is draped around an
ensemble of volcanoes, dense forest, savannah, Lake Eduard and the Ruwenzori
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mountaintops. Moreover, it is inconveniently located right at the epicentre of a geo-
graphy of complex patterns of (violent) conflict. Poaching, charcoal production, pro-
spective oil exploration, illicit cultivation and livestock breeding threaten the park’s
biodiversity, including the emblematic mountain gorilla. What is more, armed groups
use the park as a base, and catalyse illicit economic activities mainly for neighbouring
populations, but also for their own profit.
Today, however, the challenges the park faces are mirrored by the creativity of
conservation strategies that are deployed to protect the park’s wildlife. Virunga’s
management deploys the full register of innovations in conservation: combining pub-
lic-private partnerships, transnational alliances, commodification, big philanthropy,
film star activism and aggressive militarism.11 Under the leadership of de Merode,
who is part of Belgium’s aristocracy, the Virunga Park seduces donors – otherwise
disenchanted with a history of failing peace-building initiatives in Congo – into banking
his unconventional conservation efforts.12 Unconventional, because the Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) transferred the entire responsibility for the management of the park
from the Congolese state institution for the protection of nature, the Institut Congolais
pour La Conservation de La Nature (ICCN) to a British NGO, the Virunga Foundation.
In addition to reinforcing law-enforcement in the park, the transnationalised park
management adopted a business model to conservation. This is done through the
‘Virunga Alliance’, which is officially a public-private initiative – but in practice a
nearly to complete privatised initiative.13 Its aims are three-fold: generating resources
for the park, contributing to sustainable development and peace-building.
The Virunga Alliance turned to electrification as one central tactic in their strategy to
conserve the park. Evident in the preponderant resources allocated to it in the overall
conservation strategy, the European Commission (EC) alone already decided to allocate
over 46 million Euro for the period (2016–2020). How, one might ask, does a pillar of
industrialisation help achieve nature conservation? The Virunga Alliance aims to build
a total of seven hydropower plants, and electrification is portrayed as a silver bullet,
achieving a number of disparate goals at once.
First, a steady flow of electricity should create jobs: alternative occupations specifi-
cally for those young men who now enrol in the armed groups that scourge the park.
Currently many people living around the park solicit the protection of these rebel
groups when they enter the park to produce charcoal, engage in fishing and
agriculture.14 Illustrating the weight Virunga’s strategy attaches to hydropower as a
pacifying force, De Merode often repeats the quote with which we opened this article:
every megawatt of current equals a thousand jobs for potential spoilers. Based on a
simple equation of conflict in the park with economic motives reminiscent of Paul
Collier’s ‘greed’ thesis, it is believed that if the population will ‘gain’ from the park they
will desolidarise themselves from the multiple rebel groups.15 Second, electrification is
supposed to diminish pressure on the park by offering an alternative to charcoal as a
source of cooking fuel. Third, hydropower is to translate into motor force, to jump start
private sector development in the vicinity, again as a way to create a ‘peace buffer’
around the park. Indeed, Virunga sets the example itself: the hydropower installations
are run by a corporate entity, Virunga SARL. Fourth, current should materialise as
public lighting, to symbolise the positive impact of conservation on livelihoods of
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surrounding populations. Finally, in the long term, electrification will add a durable
source of financing for conservation.16
It is hard to argue that bringing hydropower to Congo is a bad thing. Livelihoods are
notoriously precarious, and 89 per cent of the Congolese population (estimated at 80
million) have no access to electricity. While Congo has notoriously untapped hydro-
power potential, most of the hydropower it does produce is absorbed by the mining
sector or exported. Instead, fuelwood and charcoal make up 93 per cent of energy use in
the DRC, which has considerable negative effects on Congo’s forests and protected
areas.17
While it is beyond the scope of this article to do fully justice to the extensive
literature on neo-liberal conservation – the extension and use of market-based
approaches to nature conservation,18 it is important to highlight that Virunga
Alliance is an epitomic example of neo-liberal conservation (and peace-building). The
existing literature describes how the focus shifted from how ‘nature is used in and
through the expansion of capitalism, to how nature in conserved in and through the
expansion of capitalism’.19 Only by overlooking its inherent contradictions, does the
market-based approach to conservation followed by the Virunga Alliance offer solu-
tions to a range of problems. The specific ‘business approach to conservation’,20 is based
on the idea that nature should be able ‘to pay for itself’, and that through ecosystem
services and tourism for example, national parks can be financially self-sustaining.
While others have already criticised this idea extensively, our specific case extends
this question by probing, should peace pay for itself, as well? The business for peace
paradigm – increasingly carried by the UN Global Compact – seems to argue it does: it
aims to thrust the win-win logic of business into the peace-building field, by arguing
that business can (and should) ‘do better’.21 Part of Virunga’s attraction is exactly that it
is not a traditional aid implementer, but promises to deploy the efficacy and growth
models of the corporate world to achieve peace outcomes.
The technopolitics of ‘green peace’
How can we attend to the politics of ‘green peace’, the incorporation of (environmental)
peace-building in a green economy agenda, when it operates through electrification? As
so many conservation efforts are technical in nature, there have been some calls to
establish a dialogue between critical conservation studies and Science and Technology
Studies (STS),22 which we aim to do in our analysis of the imbrication of the politics of
electrification with conservation regimes. Our main theoretical point of departure is
that electricity and large technical systems more generally, do not constitute a neutral
background to society but actively participate it its constitution. Numerous studies
underscore how unfolding technical systems intervene in controversies around who
gets to participate in the usage of their benefits (whether in service or revenues),
reconfigure lifestyles of communities and can render cleavages between conflicting
groups more durable.23 To wits, the field of STS was jump-started by Hughes, who
called electricity systems ‘networks of power’ in his seminal history of electrification.24
Subsequently, increasing numbers of social scientists have started to challenge the
analytical separation between the technical and social, deploying such notions as
‘technopolitics’ and ‘socio-technical assemblages’ to instead foreground the
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fundamental entanglement and co-constitution of technical and political worlds.25
Foreshadowing a discussion continued in the next section, if infrastructure is most
notable for its absence in Congo, infrastructure initiatives participate even more actively
in circumscribing and rearranging social and political relations,26 and it should come as
no surprise that the spectre of ‘modern’ infrastructure haunts both Congolese politics
and popular discourse.
The central insight from STS we take with us to analyse Virunga’s efforts to
achieve peace through electrification, is that infrastructure is ‘lively’:27 while denoting
the realm of the passive, fixed and concrete, infrastructure actively intervenes in, and
often has surprising effects on, society, eluding the neatly schematised intentions and
expectations with which they were conceived. The gist of this article is, then, to
investigate the political tensions that build up around the unfolding technical system,
that connects the Virunga Park to its surroundings – in ways that might escape the
control of those who started it. In order to appreciate the politics of electrification, it
is necessary to follow the production and circulation of current itself.28 Before
providing an overview of the main tensions that emerge along the infrastructures
through which Virunga aims to electrify peace in Eastern Congo, the next section
turns to examine the way that infrastructure and power are entangled historically in
Congo.
The historical context: Congo’s political infrastructure
In order to appreciate the stake that electricity forms in Congo, it is necessary to
understand its historical backdrop. A century ago, Belgians regarded infrastructure as
they key tool to exploit and ‘civilise’ what they portrayed as ‘backward’ populations.29
The colonial administration embarked on huge railway, telegraph and electrification
schemes, crowned by the Inga hydropower dam, which was portrayed as turning one of
the great bottlenecks of Congo’s challenging natural environment into the largest
victory of colonisation.
Large technical systems, radiating outward from a rational colonial centre of power,
afforded a measure of centralised control over local society, disrupting hitherto more
decentralised and thence difficult to govern alternative livelihoods.30 Rural electrifica-
tion, in particular, was central to colonial policy: both to power up agricultural output,
to fix rural populations into place and to stem the urbanisation of the later colonial
period.31 Admired, in the 1950s, for being the most industrially advanced of European
colonies, Belgian Congo has since come to be regarded as both a poster-child of
infrastructural modernisation and brute violence.
This also applies for the approach the Belgians created national parks in Congo.
Virunga National Park, at that time Albert National Park, was designed and imple-
mented following a blue print approach, whole villages and populations were removed
to create the park in 1925. While the colonial park management was perceived as one of
the best working institutions in the colony, the population regarded the park manage-
ment mostly as coercive and violent.32 In independent Congo, the connection between
infrastructure and predatory rule remained strong. In a powerful analysis, James
Fairhead called Mobutu’s roads ‘paths of authority’.33 Having spent 20 months in a
small village close to Virunga he noted that improved roads did not facilitate access to
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 21
markets for small local agricultural producers, as was expected, but rather served the
interests of state-supported elites, by extending their reach to more activities to tax.
Contrary to conventional ‘development’ wisdom at the time, Fairhead noted how
people actually preferred to avoid new roads.
Equally, the extension of infrastructure often goes hand in hand with the private
appropriation by political elites of the most valuable resources. The central role of
infrastructure in channelling donor money towards private pockets was epitomised in
Mobutu’s ‘white elephants’: huge, shiny and utterly useless infrastructures that
crumbled quickly – useless except for appropriating the resources during the process
of construction.34 That this is a timeless problem in relation to infrastructure is
illustrated by a 2010 World Bank paper which underscored that ‘the fact that such
private agendas are often ignored goes a long way toward explaining why infrastructure
policies fail and why best practice can be counterproductive’.35
The association between infrastructure and development remain as complex today. On
the one hand, Congolese attach symbolical value to infrastructure development. However,
in practice, those modern infrastructures that exist in Congo are largely lodged within
privatised enclaves, mostly around the highly securitised spaces of industrial mining
concessions and humanitarian hubs.36 As we highlighted earlier, most of the hydropower
Congo generates is equally diverted towards such enclaves of modernity. Most Congolese
largely live with, through, or despite, the ruins of Belgian colonial infrastructure, and have
adapted their survival strategies to the disassembly of colonial infrastructure and its
attendant visions of order.37 This means, as we have noted, that 93 per cent Congolese
today rely on charcoal and fuelwood as their main source of energy; the generation,
distribution and consumption of which is informal, artisanal, fragmented and decentra-
lised – a nightmare for states with aspirations to control and tax energy in a centralised
fashion. On the other, infrastructure today also retains some of the connotations of
control and imposition that pervaded throughout Congo’s turbulent history. From 2008
to 2012, the joint UN/Congolese stabilisation strategy explicitly envisioned roads, govern-
ment buildings and other large-scale infrastructures as a central tool to extend state
authority and security across conflict-ridden eastern Congo.38 To indicate how charged
such infrastructural interventions are, Congolese have in the past resisted and rebelled
against such extensions of technical systems in their life worlds.39
From building stability to electrifying conservation
In some ways, Virunga’s efforts to electrify eastern Congo resonate with the UN’s
approach to infrastructure. Except now its not stabilisation, but conservation, which
underpins the drive for infrastructure. Yet in both agendas – stabilisation and con-
servation – infrastructure is militarised, as the built environment is military harnessed
to achieve peace-building outcomes. Initially the Virunga Alliance saw electricity as a
tool to halt the deforestation driven by charcoal production, while more recently it
realises that this wouldn’t be achievable due to the high price set for the electricity.
However, it is still believed that hydro-power should help transform criminal econo-
mies that destroy the park into peace economies, specifically by offering current
combatants future options of more sustainable activities. The UK’s development finance
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institution, CDC stated in a press release that the electricity of Matebe should reinte-
grate between 5,000 and 8,000 combatants into ‘productive activities’.40
To the extent that Virunga’s objectives and paradigm resembles that of the UN, the
latter’s experience can offer some caution to the former. While the spectre of centralisa-
tion and the efficient projection of state power loomed large over the large-scale
stabilisation-cum-infrastructure efforts of the UN, its effect has often been simply that
it became easier for Congolese army and police agents to go out and cream off
agricultural and mining surpluses. This, in turn, has led to instances where local
armed groups actively resisted and targeted UN-sponsored infrastructure works.41
While only succeeding to a limited extent, international interveners made the built
environment complicit in efforts to achieve contested outcomes. Contested, because the
sponsored infrastructure projects supported the extension of a predatory, and by now
illegitimate, central state authority, thus echoing the lessons that Fairhead cautioned for
almost three decades ago.42 In the meantime, most donors have abandoned infrastruc-
ture as a main tool to stabilise Congo, turning back instead to governance and
dialogue.43 Subsequently, most of the stabilisation roads have collapsed again, tortured
by heavy rainfall and surcharged trucks.44 The main lesson has been that infrastructure
alone does not beget peace: it rather depends on how infrastructure is delivered, and
what it is subsequently used for.
Theory of change vs infrastructural relations
Today, a set of metal poles can be seen in Bwisha (see Figure 1), cutting through the
landscape at a rhythm dictated by equal distances. The poles along the main roads have
lamps illuminating their surroundings, keeping the insecurities associated to the night-
time darkness at bay within a fixed radius. ‘De Merode’, locals answer without excep-
tion, ‘is the one who brought the light’. Utility infrastructures generally have a strong
association to public authority: as Geenen observed in Butembo, a Congolese town not
far from the Virunga Park, lampposts are ‘vectors of power’; who brings electricity, and
who controls the switch of public lights, enjoys public authority.45
Locals along the power line are united in their praise for public lighting. In an area
where criminality is rife, main streets now thrive with nightly activity and the percep-
tion is that crime has gone down. Local businessmen eagerly turn the stable current into
cold drinks, ground cassava flour, music blasting through speakers or a quick haircut on
the way to church. Some poor people, in a bid to demonstrate belonging to a lumines-
cent modernity, have gone out of their way to become the first in their neighbourhood
to be connected. A leader of a small displaced Batwa (‘pygmy’) community, surviving
on humanitarian aid on the outskirts of Rutshuru town, felt that now he was connected,
he belonged to the ‘first class citizens’.
Below an illuminated surface of electrified joy, however, lurk shadows of disquiet. In
the following, we outline four unexpected tensions which arise along Virunga’s electricity
wires – tensions that might upend the intention to reduce the pressure on the park and to
contribute to stability. The first concerns illuminated class differences, or how electrifica-
tion amplifies pre-existing cleavages. This also ties into, second, the question of control
afforded by particular energy infrastructures. Contrary to the decentralised charcoal
economy which prevails, Virunga’s hydropower infrastructures are engineered in such
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 23
a way that they concentrate and bundle the power to decide on distribution and
consumption in select locations. This initially unintended infrastructural translation of
electricity into political power for a select group of wealthy and well-connected entre-
preneurs in the regional capital Goma, is the vehicle through which conservation
becomes the engine behind the consolidation of a particular brand of crony capitalism.
The third concerns the extension, through electricity wires, of the reach of the highly
contested and predatory Congolese state, amplifying its taxation power into Congolese
households. Fourth, by invoicing through pre-paid electricity metres, Virunga pioneers
the introduction in Congo of a model of energy consumption in which basic services
become further dislodged from ‘rights’ to consumer ‘responsibility’.
Illuminated class differences
Virunga has extended high-tension electricity wires from its hydropower plant in
Matebe to a range of localities in its near vicinity. While Virunga’s electricity is on
offer to anyone within reach of its wires, in practice, only those who are able to afford
the connection fee of US$ 292 for 6 amperes up to US$ 902 for 32 amperes plus
additional installation fees, will benefit from current power. As a civil society group
agreed when we asked them about who of their community was already connected: ‘for
80% of our community – simple subsistence farmers living in mud huts – electricity is
as far removed from their reality and aspirations as a jumbo jet’.46 While the Virunga
Alliance aimed at illuminating all households around the park to reduce charcoal
consumption, the vast majority of people living around the park can simply not afford
to be connected. As a result, the availability of current has literally illuminated class
differences among the haves and the have-nots. Different interlocutors uttered their
concern that only the ‘classe noble’ of the area can afford current, thus casting a shadow
of doubt on the socially transformative effects associated to light. In some cases, these
illuminated class differences map onto pre-existing cleavages separating communities
who feel disproportionally victimised by the park’s policy against encroachment.
Moreover, lighting cables follow the main provincial road, around which – since
colonial times – populations have clustered. The closer to the road, the more prosperous
the tenants, because all the opportunities of trade and the location of public authority
entangle around the spaces of circulation.47 For those further away from the grid, the
pricing of current discriminates against those who should be the main intended bene-
ficiaries: poor people who make a semblance of a living off producing charcoal and
youngsters joining armed groups because limitations imposed by the park foreclose
alternative livelihoods. In most rural villages only few people are connected to the grid;
in Kiwanja the largest agglomeration in the area only 5,000 out of 65,000 have been
connected, that is only 7.7 per cent. While this might increase in the future, we thus far
witnessed cases of people instead demanding to get disconnected and to remove the cash-
power machines from their homes. Some people even tried to sabotage or demolish the
devices, and Virunga SARL brought a few people who did so to court.48 As it now stands,
the current generated by Virunga far exceeds local demand: from the 13.2 MW produced,
there is currently only an offtake of 3 MW.49 Virunga initially envisioned that its
electricity should be consumed by surrounding populations and the local private sector,
but these envisioned ‘industries’ failed to take off at the speed the Virunga Alliance
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expected, meaning that besides the rotating teams of youngsters Virunga SARL itself
employs in a subsidised public works scheme to showcase its success, very little employ-
ment (and thence reduction of armed group activity) is visible.
Moreover, the electrification intensified land speculation in the chefferie of Bwisha, in
Rutshuru territory. As the value of plots of land now within reach of electricity
infrastructure increased considerable, compared to other areas, this stimulated elites
to engage in land grabs, which reinforced existing ethnic tensions in the region, with
clashes and displacement as result. Not only between communities, but also within
families: as one man argued, ‘most of the people in this area are peasants, so they
cannot afford it. Some people sell a part of their land to be able to get connected to the
electricity, this create conflicts within families’.50 As such, while the initiative contri-
butes to rural electrification in some areas around the park – with various positive
effects for the livelihoods of the households that have electricity – the politics around
the distribution of electricity set in motion various conflicts between different actors
who were not involved in the setting up, and execution of the project.
Moreover, an additional hurdle emerged for people that were fortunate to be able to
connect to the grid. While they received the first year ‘free’ electricity, some say they
realise that this was actually included in the high costs to become connected.51 After
this free period, the cash power machines were installed, which allows power to be paid
in cash, much as prepaid mobile phone credits, this caused great concern among the
people connected because only at that moment they realised the actual price of the
electricity, some small enterprises consider to turn back to generator use, and house-
holds stop using the electricity to cook their meals and return back to using charcoal.
While worries about this price of electricity spreads, a representative of Virunga SARL
argued that this price per kilowatt was clear from the beginning, yet, for somebody
never been connected before – to hear these numbers was abstract, and instead the
followed the marketing that presented the electricity would be ‘cheap’.
To cook on electricity was good during the first ‘free’ year, but now with the cash power it is
too expensive to cook on electricity, and we’ll go back to use of makala (charcoal). We hope
they will propose something else, and change the price. One men charged for 50 dollars, and
used it within a week, while he thought it would last for a month.52
In a collective effort, 109 people connected to the grid wrote a public letter to express
their complaints to Virunga SARL, and different government institutions, as they did
not have access to other procedures to address their complaints to the electricity
company.53 Yet, in a response a representative of Virunga SARL says the high price
in unavoidable as they are pressured to pay back the loans for the construction in the
next 25 years.54 As a result, many people that made a large investment to be connected
to the grid don’t have access to electricity anymore due to the price, regretting their
hefty investment. The price of electricity is three times higher than another small-scale
hydro power project operated by a non-profit, Mundo Justo, also operating in Bwisha.
This Congolese organisation originally presented the project of the large Matebe hydro
plant to a representative of the EC in Goma, which it wanted to run as a social project.
Yet the latter took the idea and presented it to a representative of the European
Commission, who passed the proposal to the Virunga Foundation, who developed it
as a privatised project under the Virunga Alliance.55
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Privatising a public good
During most of the twentieth century, infrastructure services were provided by the
state: in Congo, electricity, as railway transport, roads, and water, was hosted in public
utility companies. Large technical systems have the specific advantage that they are easy
conduits to centralised control, making them seductive for colonial regimes, multi-
nationals and ambitious governments alike – and indeed for an organisation trying to
provide an alternative to eastern Congo’s radically decentralised charcoal economy.
Instigated by Virunga’s management, we witness the first privatised initiative to gen-
erate and sell concentrated electricity, thus constituting an alternative to the faltering
state-owned SNEL, which hitherto held a monopoly over electricity provision.
While in principle Virunga aims to distribute its current to populations surrounding
the park – thus maintaining a ‘social’ component to delivery – current far outstrips local
demand. This poses an unexpected problem: Virunga SARL desperately needs to sell its
current elsewhere in order to recover its investment in the hydro-power installations.
For a specificity of electricity, unlike oil and other derivative forms of natural resources,
is that it cannot be stored and used later, so production and consumption need to be
carefully synchronised.56
Epitomising this as an opportunity, the wealthiest and best-connected businessmen
of Goma have set up an electricity distribution company that will have a monopoly on
selling Virunga’s current in the provincial capital of North Kivu instead, called La
Société Congolaise de Distribution d’Eau et d’Electricité (SOCODEE).57 In effect, estab-
lishing this direct line of current to Goma’s big businesses was only possible, because in
June 2014 the government overturned a colonial-era law, which stipulated that current
can only be distributed by public utility companies and that the generation and
distribution of electricity cannot be in the hands of the same entity.58 Interviews with
a company representative and other entrepreneurs in Goma learnt that they envision
directing Virunga’s current to a select number of large clients – not incidentally, their
own hotels and other large companies, in which the presidential clique is widely
thought to hold important economic, and thence political, shares.59 Wealthy
Congolese and their expatriate clients aside, the rest of Goma’s inhabitants will have
to continue to rely on faltering public electricity – which might see their revenues
reduced and will be less able to service maintenance to economically modest users.60
Whereas the Virunga Alliance argues it can turn the war economy into a green peace
economy,61 using its electricity infrastructures to channel current towards the wealthiest
businessmen in Goma will have little impact on the dynamics of the war economy of
which these business people form an inherent part.
Virunga’s electricity experiment generates more tensions across the public-private
divide. The expanding range of power plants and related physical infrastructures
represent high concentrations of capital investment, and therefore also magnificent
sites for disruption. This means that they require higher measures of security than
Virunga had hitherto used. In order to secure this large technical system, the company
relies on the Congolese park rangers working for the ICCN to guard and monitor the
premises.62 While rangers themselves are state agents tasked with the conservation of
biodiversity they are de facto being diverted towards guarding infrastructure under
Virunga’s privatised business for conservation approach.
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Empowering the predatory state
In a highly unusual turn of events, President Joseph Kabila was personally present at the
inauguration of Matebe in December 2016. The reasons behind his presence were
manifold, but multiple interviewees insisted that Goma’s business elite had pressured
the President to allow Virunga to distribute in Goma via SOCODEE; Kabila had
relented at least in part because a few of these same businessmen manage a substantial
portion of the Kabila family’s assets in the area – including a new Goma hotel project of
the President’s wife – a project that was finally put into motion only after the Matebe
power plant had been announced.
But there are other reasons why public figures align with the privatisation of
electricity. The Congolese government has notorious difficulties to tax its citizens and
to collect revenues ‘officially’, while panoply of state agents collects multiple taxes
through various roadblocks and other informal arrangements.63 From the perspective
of the central government in Kinshasa, it is a lot easier to monitor and tax one large
corporation, then to have thousands of tax agents roam the countryside to try and tax
large numbers of smaller entrepreneurs.64 For tax-collecting branches of the Congolese
state, Virunga’s concentrated energy infrastructures therefore present an opportunity
compared to the decentralised charcoal economy on which most Congolese rely. The
virtually impossibility for strongmen to impose centralised restrictions or taxations on
the charcoal economy make it a popular livelihood in Congo,65 yet simultaneously a
subversive one, in the eyes of those aiming to exercise control over populations,
taxation, or energy consumption.66 Rerouting energy production, distribution and
consumption through centralising hydropower infrastructures would from this per-
spective intervene in positive ways. Indeed, state taxation is simply folded into the
pricing of Matebe’s current towards its customers.67
While some would hail this development as an extension of service delivery, state
authority, or even state-building, locally it is rather perceived as the extension of a
contested and illegitimate state. As ever so often, the extension of centralising infra-
structure goes hand in hand with the spread of illicit taxation, through the multi-
plication of roadblocks for example.68 Ultimately, the most tangible outcome of the
expansion of energy infrastructures around the park has been increased economic
activity and thence more informal taxes and roadblocks, instead of the envisioned
conservation and peace-building by the Virunga Alliance.
Economies of hope: creating neo-liberal environmental subjects
Electricity will not change people’s opinion about the park, because the electricity is too
expensive. We thought it would be a present because we are the neighbor and the victim of
the park, we though electricity would come as a compensation, but to the contrary, it is a
catastrophe. In the meantime, animals still raid the crops on our fields, and we do not receive
any form of compensation or help to chase the animals away.69
A last facet of how electrification leads to tensions relates not to the effects that the
particulars of distribution have on the possibilities to bundle taxation and consumption,
but rather to the requirements built into the devices through which end-users interface
with their own energy consumption. Households and small businesses who pay to
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connect to Virunga’s current receive a yearlong of unlimited power supply; after this
year, however, Virunga’s mechanics come and install the cash power machines. The
arrival of the ‘cash power’ system in people’s homes and businesses should ‘teach’ them
to use electricity ‘responsibly’, within their budget. As Von Schnitzler analysed the
governing effects of pre-paid water use and describes how it was the aim of the
government to re-educate the citizens of Soweto as good citizen.70 She argues that
prepaid systems, produce subjects aligned to neo-liberal reforms that are aspired by the
government, pushing them into a certain ideology of responsabilisation,71 or what
Gupta calls ‘precarious power’.72
An expatriate working for Virunga SARL reacted by saying that these small
business men will need to learn how to make a proper budget, business plan and
acquire accounting skills. For that aim, the company constructed an impressive,
large shiny building next to their hydro-power installation. The building is called a
‘business center’ and in the rural surroundings of Matebe it is unique of its kind.
Not only is the building clearly meant to impress visitors and to project both power
and transparency through its reflecting floors and many glass windows, it also
opens up onto a curated view of Virunga as a manageable wilderness: constructed
gardens, artificial waterfalls and perfectly cut grass. In the middle of Congo, it
conveys a sense of surrealism – a powerful impression, as a European diplomat
told, after the park arranged a guided tour for representatives of various European
embassies: ‘It is very impressive, and it looks like if you are in Rwanda, not in
Congo. Everything works and is proper. That they managed to build something like
this in Congo is impressive’.73 Everything in Matebe conveys the message to its
foreign investors that it manages to realise concrete gains in Goma, and that it
brings ‘modernity’.
Yet, Matebe’s second goal is to churn out eco-rational subjectivities:74 here, the
subjectivities are forged with should properly accompany the ecological and economical
modernity that Virunga sells as the future of Eastern Congo. Electricity’s transformative
power is not self-evident, and Matebe is used to train small businessmen to develop the
right skills, attitudes and approach to life required to succeed with their newly gained
electricity. Yet, as we have seen till date it is especially the imaginary of success that is
currently being sold to investors, donors and small businesspeople. As Büscher argues,
success is a particular commodity, which depends on marketing capabilities; ‘success, in
short, needs to be sold, especially in the context of contradictory and complex empirical
realities’.75
Conclusion: the technopolitics of green peace
According to the European Commission the Virunga Alliance already achieved success;
‘Virunga is an example of how ecosystem services – from the forests and water that
provide for hydropower to conservation of wildlife and landscapes for tourism and
sustainable production – can be effectively harnessed to enhance peace and prosperity
in the wider community’.76 Pressured to pay back loans to the investors in the hydro-
plants, the electricity is sold to donors as ‘social’/basic good but bought by Congolese as
a ‘luxury’ good, becoming appropriated creatively by settled classes in Congolese
society.
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However, those affected by its local operations challenge the idea that conservation,
and peace-building, should be a privatised enterprise. In their experience, the influx of
private capital with a progressive face largely translates into better-enforced exclusion
from lands and enclosed resources which they need for everyday survival. In a few local
news articles, a part of the population calls upon the park management to return to
what they believe was the initial aim of the project; to diminish the pressure on the park
by offering an alternative to the use of charcoal.77 Yet, due the elevated price of the
electricity charcoal consumption did not diminish.
Instead, in deploying the centralising powers of large technical systems, the setup
ends-up sharing some of the characteristics of other forms of enclaved infrastructures
which extract, bundle and channel natural resources away from local populations – a
mode of action which Hannah Appel aptly labelled ‘infrastructural violence’.78 By
analysing the electrification scheme of the Virunga Alliance through the lens of
technopolitics we unravelled how the particular characteristics and the implementation
of the scheme effectuated certain political and social-economic effects. Effects that are
contradictory to the stated aims of conservation and peace-building. Forcing a centra-
lised electricity scheme, to counter the radical decentralised charcoal economy, failed
because the former is of central importance to the livelihoods of many living adjacent to
the Virunga Park. Moreover, the centralised scheme created possibilities for the
Congolese state and aligned business men to profit, rather than the rural population.
The idea of ‘green peace’, the incorporation of (environmental) peace-building in a
green economy agenda, is in the case of the Virunga Alliance mostly a powerful
narrative to attract donors and investors, instead of effectuating meaningful change
for the people living in the conflict affected area of north-Kivu. These findings should
prompt further inquiries in other privatised (environmental) initiatives, which operate
in war zones under the business for peace agenda.
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